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1. Introduction 
A simplifying assumption of the "new home economics" rertili ty 
demand model is that parents produce the same quality level for each 
child; i.e. there are neither favorites nor Cinderellas.1 Yet numerous 
studies indicate systematic differences in the apparent "quality" of 
children within families, according.to their birth order. Regarding 
first-born children, there is a near-consensus: they have systematically 
higher IQ's than their yO\mger siblings; they attend school longer and 
earn more than middle-born children. Some, but not all, studies report 
an advantage of last-born children; they stay in school longer and score 
higher on achievement tests than middle-borns. 2 
Do such findings contradict the model in which utility-maximizing 
parents jointly "plan" child quantity and quality, seeking to minimize 
variance in quality? 3 An explanation based on some genetic advantage 
1R. J. Willis, "A New Approach to the Economic Theory of Fertility
Behavior," Journal of Political Economy, 81:2, Part 2 (March/April, 1973),
S-14-S64; Gary S. Becker and H. Gregg Lewis, "Interaction Between Quantity
and Quality in Children," JPE, 84 (August, 1976), S143-S162. 
2studies of birth-order effects are reviewed in the next section. 
3nie critical feature or the mdel or Willis and or Becker and Lewis 
is that or interaction between N and Q (numbers or children, quality of children)
in the production or child services. The first-order conditions from their 
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of being first-born, e.g. to younger parents, could explain some of 
the findings, but it is virtually impossible to test, and a whole new 
choice problem arises regarding whether utility-maximizing parents 
would invest in children according to a rule of complementing genetic 
advantage or substituting for it. 4 In any event, having younger 
parents at birth could not explain the advantage of the last-born 
over middle children. 
A more common explanation is that parents fail to see or plan 
for constraints on spending-per-child which will occur throughout the 
household's life cycle; first-borns and last-borns benefit from higher 
average levels of spending because they spend a higher proportion of 
childhood years in smaller families. This explanation is clearly 
inconsistent with a model in which parents jointly plan number of 
children and per-child investment; assuming capital markets permit 
saving and borrowing, parents could equalize spending on children 
across periods. Moreover, insofar as parental earnings increase 
throughout the childrearing years of the household life-cycle, any 
resource constraint represented by increasing family size could be 
offset by increased earnings, and in fact the last-born child should 
model include: UN= AQITC + ApN and UQ =ANTIC+ APQ· 
They make clear that the shadow prices of N and Qare each affected 
by the quantity of the other chosen. However, the derivation of these 
first-order conditions, and the interactive term in each shadow price,
depends on the assumption that parents provide equal inputs to "quality"
for each child. Without this assumption, the inclusion of Nin the 
shadow price of Q would make no sense. Nin this context simply mul­
tiplies the shadow price Ile by the number of children; the shadow price 
represents the average cost of increasing the quality of one child by 
one unit. --
4Gary S. Becker and Nigel Tomes, "Child Endowments and the 
Quantity and Quality of Children," JPE, 84 (August, 1976), Sl43-S162. 
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be better off than the first-born. Differences across families in the 
extent of birth-order effects by income could reflect differential 
access to capital markets; but as long as birth-order effects persist 
even in families with presumably unlimited access to such markets, we 
have not explained away the phenomenon of systematic birth-order 
differences, at least not in a framework of joint planning by parents. 
A third line of reasoning explains child quality differences 
within families in terms of the extent to which a child must share 
not only the financial resources, but also the time of parents, with 
siblings. This idea is inherent in the "confluence" theory developed 
by psychologists, according to which the ratio of all other family 
members' ages to the child's age influences positively child develop­
ment.5 
Is _the strong assumption that all parents face imperfect capital 
markets, and thus financial constraints, necessary for the quality­
quantity parent-planning model to hold up in the face of birth-order 
differences? An objective of the model developed below is to show 
that even given perfect capital markets, birth-order differences are 
likely in families in which parents are maximizing utility and seeking 
to minimize differences in quality amongst their children. The key to 
such differences is the time constraint parents face--time, unlike 
money, cannot be saved across periods. In fact, as will be shown, the 
existence of birth-order effects lends weight to the argument that time 
inputs are important in the childrearing process. 
5R. B. Zajonc, "Family Configuration and Intelligence," Science, 
192 (16 April, 1976), 227-236; and R. B. Zajonc and G. B. Markus, 
"Birth Order and Intellectual Development," Psychological Review, 82 
(April, 1975). The confluence theory is explained further, below. 
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Time can be traded for money in the market; thus mother's 
participation in the paid labor market is relevant. A notable predic­
tion of the model is that birth-order effects are less likely among 
children of working mothers; this is because mothers spendin& time in 
the labor market outside home throughout the childrearing years can 
always make the necessary marginal shifts to keep the shadow value of 
their time of equal value in all periods. They can shift out of the 
labor market as the family grows (assuming total flexibility of working 
hours) and back in as older children leave the household. 
If the mother does not work, the model indicates birth-order 
effects are likely as long as goods and mother's time are not easily 
substituted for each other in rearing children. It suggests that 
birth-order effects will only occur if childrearing is a sufficiently 
time-intensive process so that the time constraint parents face is 
binding. And it implies, given the existence of birth-order effects, 
limitations on the jointness of production of child quality; at the 
very least, it is clear that raising two children of given "quality". 
talces more time than raising one. 
The next section is a review of the literature dealing with 
birth-order effects. A third section presents the model. In a final 
section, an empirical test of the model is described, and empirical 
estimates are presented. 
2. Prior Literature 
Differences in achievement according to order of birth have long 
been noted. In 1874 Sir Francis Galton, in his English Men of Science, 
suggested "academic primogeniture" as the reason for the large proportion 
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of first-borns among the eminent men he studied. 
6 In 1912, E. L. Clark 
suggested in his American Men of Letters: Their Nature and Nurture 
that first-borns' advantage might be due to a depletion of family 
resources by the arrival of later children; this so-called "economic" 
explanation was also proposed in a 1968 article in the American Journal 
of Sociology. 7 Along with the genetic "uterine fatigue" notion,
8 these 
were, however, generally mentioned as ad hoc explanations, rather than 
as testable hypotheses; indeed they were proposed explanations for 
a casually-observed but not carefully-measured phenomenon. 
Until recently, formal studies of the birth-order question have 
been plagued with two difficulties. One has been sample selection. 
Typical groups for study have been college students and eminent 
scientists. 9 Such studies were based on samples selective in terms 
of the dependent variable, e.g. education attained. The procedure 
has been to compare the proportion of first-borns in the sample to 
6
The Galton study is cited by Vlilliam D. Altus, "Birth Order 
and Its Sequelae," Science, 151 (7 January, 1966), 44-49. 
'1 
'Clark's book (Columbia University Press) is also cited by 
Altus. The 1968 article is that of Bert N. Adams and Miles T. Meidam, 
"Economics, Family Structure and College Attendance," AJS, 74 (November, 
- .1968), 230-239. 
8 
Referred to by Alan E. Bayer, "Birth Order and College Attendance," 
Journal of 1farriage and the Family, 28 (November, 1966), 480-484. 
9E.g. Stanley Schachter, ["Birth Order, Eminence and Higher 
Education," American Sociological Review, 28 (October, 1963), 757-767] 
who studied a small group of University of Minnesota students. Altus 
refers to analysis by Nichols (unpublished) of the scores of top 
finalists in the United States National Merit Scholarship Qualification 
Tests, and to his own data on students at the University of California, 
Berkeley and Santa Barbara campuses. 
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that in the population. But this procedure poses several problems. 
As one observer put it: 
Changes and fluctuations in the marriage rate, age 
at marriage, completed family size, age of mother 
at first and last births, spacing of children, age. 
structure of the population and size of the popu­
lation may all affect the proportion in a given 
ordinal position in a sample at any point in time. 10 
If all persons in a sample are of the same age, cohort changes in 
education will affect representation of persons of certain birth-order 
positions. For example, first-borns of any given age are likely to 
have younger parents than later-borns of the same age. If younger 
parents are on average better-educated than older parents, first-borns 
may be overrepresented in college classes, not because they are 
11first-borns but because they have better-educated parents on average. 
Similarly, if there is a current annual increase in the proportion of 
first-borns going to college, first-borns will be overrepresented among 
college students,~ if within families there will be no differences 
across children, i.e. later children will also attend. And if within 
families, later-born children actually have a real advantage, but there 
is an annual increase in the proportion of all high-school graduates 
going to college, no differences among college students by birth-order 
12will emerge. 
10
Bayer, p. 483. 
11 
Adams e.nd Meidam suggest younger parents are more likely 
to be white-collar rather than blue-collar workers (p. 238). 
12 
Albert I. Hermalin, "Birth Order and College Attendance: 
A Comment," Journal of Marriage and the Family, 29 (August, 1967), 
417-421. 
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With these types of samples, moreover, the control for family 
size is critical. As explained below, being first-born is highly 
correlated with having few siblings; thus an apparent advantage of 
first-borns may be merely due to the advantage children from.small 
families may enjoy. Thus a second and related 
difficulty of early studies has been confinement of tests to two and 
three-way cross-tabulations. Attempts to control for family size (and 
for socio-economic class, on the grounds that it might be highly and 
negatively correlated with family size) were often restricted to two 
13 or three family size or socio-economic class groups. 
For these reasons, until the mid-1960s, the focus of studies 
was on whether differences by birth-order were a real phenomenon, and 
attention went primarily to the hypothesized advantage of first-borns. 
Differences_ were reported in some studies but not in others, and the 
question remained unresolved. 14 
More recently, however, the availability of much larger samples 
and the use of the computer to facilitate analysis of them, have 
permitted more careful tests. In particular, the large s~Tiples have 
improved the results even using simple cross tabulations, by allowing 
13Bayer; Ben Barger and Everette Hall, "The Interrelationships 
of Family Size and Socioeconomic Status for Parents of College Students," 
Journal of 1furriage and the Family, 28 (May, 1966), 180-187. 
14
Studies reporting no significant relationship between ordinal 
position and attainment include Barger and Hall; Nichols (cited by 
Altus); and Altus' study of Santa Barbara college students. Schachter; 
Adams and Meidam; and Bayer among others report an advantage for 
first-borns. Bayer mentions a 1933 Handbook of Child Psychology 
article by Harold Jones (ed. Carl Murchison) in which Jones lists 
100 studies of birth-order differences, and no consensus regarding 
their existence. 
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examination of birth-order differences within all possible sibship 
size groups. And in most of these large samples, the dependent 
variable has been a score on a test of some kind rather than educa­
tional attainrnent; 15 such scores may provide a more finely-tuned (if 
still imperfect) measure of child "quality." 
Bayer examined birth-order differences among 45,000 United 
States high school students who took several achievement tests. 16 
His was one of the early reports that last-borns, as well as first­
borns, had an advantage over middle-borns. However, he included 
children from two-child families, so that all middle children were 
from larger families, and the f8.JI)ily size control was imperfect. 
Belmont and Marolla17 examined 400,000 19-year-old Dutch persons 
who took a battery of tests; within all family size groups they found 
monotonically decreasing scores by order of birth. 
Zajonc reviewed evidence from large samples of Dutch (the same 
data as in Belmont and Marolla's work), U.S., Scottish and French 
children. He attributed the lesser decline in scores with order of 




zajonc reports results of studies based on the Raven test 
(in the Netherlands); the National Merit Scholarship Qualification 
Test (in the U.S.); an IQ test (Gille) (in France); and the Stanford­
Binet test (in Scotland) (p. 228). 
16 
These .data were collected in 1960 as part of the Project 
Talent study. 
17 
Lillian Belmont and Francis A. Marolla, "Birth Order, Family 
Size and Intelligence," Science, 182 (14 December, 1973), 1096-1101. 
18 
Zajonc, pp. 229-230. 
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groups, in fact, he reports a U-shaped relationship, i.e. middle-born 
children do least well. 
These samples exposed contradictory results regarding any 
advantage for later-borns. But in a careful analysis of about 200,000 
Israeli eighth-grade students, Davis, Cohan and Bashi19 proposed a 
resolution of that question. They divided their sample between children 
of European and Oriental parents. For the former group they reported 
the standard result of decreasing scores with increasing order of birth. 
For the latter group, they found increasing scores for later-borns from 
families of four or more children. They rejected Zajonc's proposal 
that greater spacing explains a lesser advantage for early-borns, since 
birth intervals were probably smaller, not greater, in the larger 
Oriental families. They proposed instead that later-borns did better 
in the Oriental families because they had the benefit of help from 
older siblings; and that the relative value of this help increases 
20the lower the education of parents. Oriental parents were assumed 
to have lower average educational attainment than European parents. 
Their idea is of particular relevance for studies of birth-order 
effects using developing country data, such as this one for Colom-
bia. In many developing count~ies, educational opportunities· have 
been increasing rapidly (as is the case for Colombia), 
19
Daniel J. Davis, Saul Cohan and Joseph Bashi, "Birth Order 
and Intellectual Development: The Confluence Model in the Light of 
Cross-Cultural Evidence," Science, 196 (24 June, 1977), 1470-1472. 
20 
This idea might explain Altus' report that i~ Nichols' data 
on U.S. high school students who took the National Merit Scholarship 
Qualification test, statistically significant higher scores for first­
borns showed up only within the group of top finalists. Across all 
students taking the test, no such difference was found. See footnote 
14 above. 
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so that older children's education often exceeds that of their parents. 
These analyses have established differences in achievement by 
order of birth as widespread, if of varying patterns. I know of no 
effort, however, to develop and test a theory of the determinants of 
such differences. As noted above, a popular ad hoc explanation is the 
"economic" one--that parents run out of resources with successive 
children; why parents would not borrow across periods to equalize 
spending on different children has not been considered. Social 
psychologists have proposed that first-borns do better because of 
greater "dependence" and orientation to "adult norms, 1121 but these 
ideas are difficult to test empirically. 
A more parsimonious explanation is Zajonc's "co.;nfluence" 
theory. 22 Intellectual environment in the home is defined as the 
average of the absolute intellectual levels of all family members; 
the intellectual level of family members is simply measured by their 
age. Children's intellectual development is a function of the home 
"intellectual environment," and thus of the average age of family 
members. The average age of the family falls as more children are 
born, so early-born children are better off. This confluence theory 
can be reconciled with the reversal of effects when parents have low 
education, as in the Israeli data, if intellectual environment is 
defined in terms of average years of education of family members, 
instead of average age. The confluence theory does not refer explicitly 
to time inputs to children of different birth orders, though it can 
21c. Norman Alexander, Jr., "Ordinal Position and Social 
Mobility," Sociometry, 31 (September, 1968), 285-293. 
22 zaJonc,· p. 22? • 
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clearly be interpreted in terms of time inputs of parents (and siblings). 
In ~y event, no explicit test of the theory has been proposed. 
In a study of family size and birth-order, Lindert comes closer 
to a formal test of a theory. 23 He hypothesizes that both financial 
resources and time determine differences among children. 24 He uses 
only predicted differences in time inputs in his empirical analysis, 
with the predicted differences being derived from time use data. 
Unfortunately, the analysis itself does not provide a test of differ­
ences specific to birth-order because of the particular procedure he 
follows. He measures the difference between first and middle-borns 
in families with six or more children; he then uses dummy variables 
to compare this difference to differences for children in groups which 
combine both other birth-order positions and other sibship sizes. He 
thus mixes birth-order and family size effects. 25 
In a paper concerned with differences across rather than within 
families in children's achievement, Hill and Stafford argue that most 
family background variables_that are used to explain such differences, 
including family size, are actually no more than a reflection of 
differential parental time inputs to children. 26 Could time inputs 
23i.indert, Fertility and Scarcity in .America, Ch. 6 and 
Appendix C. See also his earlier version of that chapter, "Family 
Inputs and Inequality among Children," University of Wisconsin 
Institute for Research on Poverty Discussion Paper (October, 1974). 
24
Lindert, Fertility and Scarcity in .America, pp. 201-204. 
25
Ibid., Table 6-J, p. 196. 
26
C. Russell Hill and Frank P. Stafford, "Family Background and 
Lifetime Earnings," paper presented at the Econometric Society meetings, 
San Francisco, 1974. See also Leibowitz, AER. 
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explain both differences within families by children's birth-order, 
and by implication, differences across families by family size? This 
question is the basis for the model and the empirical tests which 
follow. 
3. A Birth-Order Model 
The model is specified for mothers working outside the home 
and those not. For simplicity, it is assumed that the father devotes 
no time to the care of children (not a terribly strong assumption, 
based on time use data from household surveys). 27 
Substitutes for mother's care time (including servants, baby­
sitters, relatives who help care for children) can be purchased from 
non-parents, but to raise a child, some input of mother's time is 
required in every period. Time inputs of older siblings may be 
important, 28 but are not explicitly modelled. 
27Robert E. Evenson and Elizabeth K. Quizon, "Time Allocation 
and Home Production in Philippine Rural Households," (paper presented 
at International Center for Research on Women workshop, Elkridge, 
Maryland, April 1978) report that fathers in a swuple of rural Filipino 
households devote an average of 20 minutes per day to child care 
(Table 1, p. 4). Further, in their sample, fathers' child care time 
does not increase with increases in the number of children (Table 4, 
p. 12). Father's time in nonphysical care of children in a 1967 U.S. 
sample was .J hours per day (Kathryn E. Walker, "The Potential for 
Measurement of Nonmarket Household Production with Time-Use Data," 
paper prepared for International Sociological Association IX World 
Congress of Sociology, Uppsala, Sweden, April 1978, p. 17). Gilbert 
G. Ghez and Gary S. Becker [The Allocation of Time and Goods Over 
the Life Cycle (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975)) find 
with U.S. data a slight increase in working hours of men with increases 
in family size (Table Jl, pp. 98-99), presumably because of greater 
family needs and/or because the wife drops out of the labor force to 
increase her childrearing time. Such specialization implies men's 
child care time does not increase as family size increases. 
28Da. Cv1s, ohan, and Bashi. 
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The father's wage and hours of work are assumed invariant with 
respect to number of children and the mother's work hours and wage. 29 
An important simplifying assumption of the working-mother 
version is that she can adjust her hours of work in the market at 
will across periods. The implication of relaxing this assumption is 
elaborated on below. Her wage is also assumed constant across periods, 
though an increasing wage can be built into the model, and the impli­
cation for birth-order effects is straightforward. Prices are constant 
across periods in both versions of the model. Genetic endowment of 
children is assumed not to vary in any way related to birth order. 
The model does not allow for joint production in the use of mother's 
time to raise children, nor does the childrearing productive efficiency 
of mothers increase with parity or time. 
Working mother version 
The model takes parents' number of children as given. Recall 
the model of the preceding chapter, in which parents maximized a 
uti j i ty i'u,nct.1 nn 
U = U( N, Q, Z) 
where N was number of children, Q average quality, and Zan index 
of other commodities. This model, in contrast, is conditional on 
290r1ey Ashenfelter and James Heckman, ("The Estimation of Income 
and Substitution Effects in a Model of Family Labor Supply," Econometrica, 
42 (January, 1974), 73-86] find a zero elasticity of men's hours of work 
with respect to wife's wage (p. 74). Ghez and Becker, pp. 98-101, report 
that in the U.S. men with more children work more hours, but the increase 
in their hours is small. 
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N. 30 Parents maximize utility according to the function 
u C U(~qi, Vqi, S) 
1 
where qi refers to the quality of the ith child and i (i=l, • n) 
is the order of birth (aU/aiqi > O); Vq. is the variance in quality 
. 1 
1 
among children (aU/aVqi < O); and S represents the parents' standard 
of living (au;as > o). 
The mother produces quality in children according to the 
production function 
jllm qiJqijk "' Ykf( tij' xi.i) ; Iqi = 
where tij is mother's time inputs to the ith child in the jth period 
{j=l, • m) and xij are purchased inputs to the ith child in the 
jth period, including goods and the time of persons other than the 
mother in child care which mothers purchase. yk (k=l, ••• r) is an 
efficiency parameter which declines with the age of the child such that 
the marginal product of time and goods is greater the younger the child. 
This is consistent with the findings of many studies of children's 
physiological and psychological development indicating the importance 
of the early years.31 The efficiency parameter is not required to 
30 
A complete fertility model would explain N jointly with 
average Q and minimized variance in Q among children. See below, 
p. 86, for reference to an additional dimension, spacing of children. 
31Alan Berg, The Nutrition Factor (Washington, D.C.: The 
Brookings Institution, 1973), discusses malnutrition in infants, the 
resultant loss of "learning time .•• during the most critical· 
periods of learning" (p. 10) and the question of the reversibility 
of its damage (pp. 9-10 and references, p. 249). 
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generate some birth-order effects; in a family of three or more children, 
the model predicts that middle children are worse off than first and 
last-born without this 11 y-factor." Without they-factor we would 
predict, however, no difference between first and last-born. 
To simplify the exposition, in the case shown here a new child 
is born into the household in each time period, and the duration of 
time periods corresponds exactly to the duration of developmental 
phases, or y-factors. Thus for this case spacing of births is fixed 
in relation to developmental phases. The actual relation between 
spacing and birth-order effects can be shown to be a function of the 
y-factor, as is explained below.32 
The production function for Sis 
where xs and ts represent goods and time in each of the j periods. 
Utility is maximized subject to these production functions and 
the following constraints, numbering m+l: 
, 
' +l, l. - ' J to l mJ: tj = rt .. + tpj tsj. 1J1 
and m+l: V = -Ewt . + PxX + PsSj PJ 
32Also, for the case shown, there are. enough time periods 
(j=l, . m), and there are not so many developmental periods, 
such that all children pass through all the developmental phases 
(k=l, •.. r). Thus the number of time periods equals or exceeds 
the number of children plus r-1 "y-factors" (m>n+r-1); by the last 
period, the last child has completed the last developmental phase and 
older children have left the household in sequence. The model is thus 
outlined for "completed childrearing." In real life, of course, the 
number of time periods is limited only by the life expectancy of parents 
and the restriction that a period cannot be shorter in duration than 
9 or 10 months. With 5 y-factors and 10 children born 18 months apart, 
-16-
where rtij is total time devoted to the children present in the jth 
i 
period; tpj is time spent working in the "paid" labor market; tsj is 
time spent producing S; Vis husband's earned income plus household 
unearned income; w is the wage; and Px and Ps are the prices .of goods 
used in production of child quality and of S. Thus in each period, 
the mother is constrained by total available time in that period. The 
income constraint, on the other hand, is not period-specific; parents 
face no capital market imperfections, so that goods can be traded freely 
across periods. 
Given the utility function, production functions and constraints, 
we wish to show 
33 
r_q1·=1 > rq > rq. 2 . n . 1= n-1 
J J J 
i.e. that the first-born child receives more time and goods than the 
last-born and middle-born children, and the last-born more than the 
middle-born. The model is worked through here for the 3-child case, 
with 2 efficiency parameters and 4 periods. Appendix A outlines the 
model for then-child, r-pararneter, m-period case. 
With n=3, m=4 and r=2 there are 26 first-order conditions, with 
the Lagrangean multipliers Al' A2, A3 and A4 repres
enting the time 
constraint in each of the 4 periods, and A representing the income5 
constraint: 
we thus require at least 14 18-month time periods (21 years) for 
parents to complete the childrearing process. 
33It is also true that middle-born children (i=2, ••• n-1) 
can differ in total quality, depending on the number of y-factors, 
their magnitude, and spacing. The relationship between spacing and 
y-factors is discussed below. 
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ar 
(2) y -- Uql22 = "2 
2 atl22 
= " 3 
elf 




= "p5 X 
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= A p5 X 
ar 
( 12) 'Y -- Uq342
2 ax342 
au as ]Ut = ---
sj as atsj[ 
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+(22) tj=l = tlll + tpl t sl 
(23) tj=2 = tl22 + t221 + tp2 + ts2 
( 24) =t.J=3 t232 + t331 + tp3 + ts3 
(26) V = -rwt . + PxX + PsS . 
j PJ 
The solution is straightforward. From (13), (14), (15) and (16) 
i.e. the mother's marginal value of time is equated in every period to 
ht:r w1:1~t: .1:i:1tt:. It follows that conditions (1) to (6) a.re equal to ea.ch 
other. Thus 
Also, conditions (7) to (12) are equal to each other, so that 
Y af =y ar =y elf =y elf =y elf =y elf 
1 ax111 2 elX122 1 elX221 2 ax232 1 elX331 2 -ax_3_4_2 · 
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It follows that 
3f' 3f a, 3f 
Y1 + Y2 + Y1 + Y2 = 
atlll atl22 axlll ax122 
Jf ar ar Zlf =Y1 + Y2 + yl + y2
at221 3t2J2 ax221 ax232 
343f 3f ar 3f 
+ y + y + yyl 
at331 2 3t342 1 oXJJl 2 clXJ42 
and there are no birth order effects. Thus with the mother able to 
adjust her working hours so that the marginal value of her time in 
every period is the same as the marginal value of her wage, there are 
no birth-order effects. The time constraints do not affect child quality 
because the mother can "trade 11 market time for child care time as child 
care demands change across periods. 
Non-working mother version 
Non-working mothers have the same utility function and child 
quality production They face m+l constraints: 
( 1) to Cm): tJ = rt .. + t .
i lJ SJ 
and 
1 • t . 1 . tha· t 
and 
34Th1s· equa 1 y imp 1es 
tlll= t221= t331 > t122= t2J2= t342, 
X111= X221= XJJl > X122= X232• XJ42 ' 
Other combinations are possible, however. If t 111 > t 221 , then 
x x in an exactly compensating amount in production, and 111 < 221 
similarly with time and goods inputs to children in other periods. 
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For the 3-child, 4-period, 2-efficiency parameter case, first­
order conditions (1)-(12) are the same as in the working mother model. 
Subsequent first-order conditions are: 
(13) Utsl = Al ; [Ut . = au~]SJ a'S" at .
SJ 
(17) auas = "'-5Ps 
as a~xsj 
J 
(18) tj=l = tlll + \1 
( 22 ) V = PxX + PsS 
a. The case of perfect substitution 
Only under unrealistic conditions will this model not predict 
the emergence of birth-order effects. One such unrealistic case is 
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that of perfect substitution between time and goods inputs in the child 
quality production function.3 5 With perfect substitution, first-order 
condition (1) is equal to (7), as are (2) and (8), (J) and (9), 
(4) and (10), (5) and (11) and (6) and (12). Since conditions (6) 
to (12) equal each other, it follows that conditions (1) to (6) equal 
each other. Thus Al= A2 = AJ = A4, i.e. the marginal value of time 
is the same in each period, even for the non-working mother; since 
she can substitute goods for time freely in apparently time-short 
periods 2 and 3, when both children are present, the time constraint 
built into the model becomes irrelevant. 
b. The time-intensity of child quality production 
Similarly, birth-order effects would not be predicted if inputs 
or (111uU1er' s) time were insignificant compared to x inputs in the 
production function. First-order conditions (1) through (6) can be 
written: 
af 
y a Uq. "k = A. A. > 0 
k t~{~ 1J J J 
,._c)-U• 
If child quality production is highly goods-intensive,. the marginal 
product of time-inputs is rapidly driven to zero and Aj equals zero, 
i.e. the time constraint is not binding. (Strictly speaking, this 
can o~ly occur where the demand for mothers' labor in the market is 
zero; otherwise the mother would work outside the home. However, it 
35 
It is also possible that goods and time are complementary 
inputs. This is plausible if we include another factor in the pro­
duction function, e.g. the child's innate ability. Complementarity 
between goods and time would enhance the advantage of first and last­
borns. 
-23-
is possible to imagine situations in which entry costs (e.g. additional 
education or training) are high enough or hours in the paid labor 
market inflexible enough, so that women stay home even when the 
marginal product of their time in producing Sor q is zero. Thus 
women with teen-age children appear to have time on their hands; 
indeed it is precisely when children reach older ages that it is 
likely they are no longer time-intensive.36 ) 
c. The constant returns to scale assumption 
A more plausible assumption is diseconomies of scale in produc­
tion, whereby a reduction of inputs (to any one child) will reduce 
quality by proportionately less. Diseconomies in this sense are 
similar to an assumption of diminishing returns to additional inputs 
of time and goods to any one child. Imagine that the child's 
"endowment" (e.g. ability) were explicitly included in the production 
function; then diminishing returns to additional inputs would seem 
plausible. These diminishing returns could offset (and even reverse) 
the predicted advantage of the first and last 
Increasing returns to scale in inputs, on the other hand, would 
increase the advantage of the first and last child. 
Assuming there are diminishing returns, even imperfect substi­
tution and time-intensity together do not guarantee birth-order effects. 
On the other hand, if there are increasing returns, we could expect 
36
Gronau ["Leisure, Home Production and Work--The Theory of the 
Allocation of Time Revisited," National Bureau of Economic Research 
Working Paper no. 137 (1976), pp. 30-31] notes that the goods-intensive 
riature of children becomes more explicit as they grow older. See also 
his "The Effect of Children on the Housewife's Value of Time," Economics 
of the Family, ed. Theodore W. Schultz (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1974), especially pp. 472-486. 
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birth-order effects even given perfect substitution and time-intensity. 
d. Joint production 
Joint production of either Sand q., or q._1 and qi_21 1- - , .•••n 
could also offset birth-order effects. If the mother can simultaneously 
"produce" quality in two children, or simultaneously produce child 
quality and other corrnnodities, the difference between the first and 
second periods evaporates. Some element of joint production is not 
implausible, e.g. if when mothers read to two children, each derives 
the full benefit of her time, or if mothers combine child care with 
food preparation. 
Here there is no confounding syrrnnetry; joint production could 
eliminate the predicted advantage of first and last-barns, but would 
not enhance the situation of middle-barns. 
On the production side birth-order effects are thus predicted 
as long as we accept the production assumptions of the standard (Willis; 
Becker and Lewis) ioodel of fertility, i.e. the elasticity of substitution between 
t and x is less than inffrdte; production of child quality is time-intensive; 
there are constant returns to scale; and there is not joint production. 
e. The utility function 
However, even if on the production side, none of the conditions 
tending to mitigate birth-order effects obtained, sufficient distaste 
for variance among children in quality could lead parents to trade off 
higher average quality and/or a higher S to reduce variance and eliminate 
differences by birth-order. If there were no period-specific time 
constraints, or if production conditions made the time constraints 
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not binding, parents could automatically minimize variance by simply 
maximizing average quality--given diminishing returns to parental . 
inputs to any one child, and given that genetic endowment of children 
does not differ systematically by birth order. However, once the time 
constraint becomes binding, not only production conditions but also 
the nature of the utility function will affect the extent of differences 
among children. Parents, depending on their preferences, may choose 
differential quality investments, because of the time constraint. 
f. One case predicting birth-order effects 
An empirical finding of the existence of birth-order effects 
has this advantage: for families which we can show face no capital 
constraint, the persistence of birth-order effects implies that 
certain production conditions do not obtain. For· example, if we bar 
the possibility of increasing returns (to inputs to any one child), 
then emergence of the predicted birth-order effects eliminates the 
joint possibility of perfect substitution, goods-intensity, joint 
production, and diminishing returns. A .Pinniri_g ·ar differences by 
birth order does not allow us to distinguish among the different 
production conditions in terms of their relative importance; this 
would require much more detailed data on actual time and goods inputs 
to children over a considerable period (consider the difficulties of 
estimating production functions even for shoes or tractors). But the 
elimination of certain production possibilities is a finding in itself, 
particularly insofar as it points up the centrality of time use in 
childrearing. 
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To simplify exposition of how the model under certain conditions 
predicts birth-order differences among children of non-working mothers, 
a specific case is presented here. We assume constant returns to 
scale and no joint production. Child quality production is assumed 
to be sufficiently time-intensive so that the time constraint in each 
period is binding. Finally, substitution of goods for time is con­
strained in a certain way. First, note that from first-order conditions 
( 1 ) and ( 13 ) ; ( 2 ) , ( 3 ) and (14); ( 4), ( 5 ) and ( 15 ) ; and ( 6) and ( 16 ) , 
the following equalities hold: 
au as(a) ---- = y af • Utlll = Al 
as ats1 1 at111 
au as(b) ----
( C ) au as = v af = v af,2 ,1 
at232 at331 
(d) au as = v af•2 
at342 
For birth-order effects to emerge, we wish to show that A4 <Al< A2 = A3, 
i.e. that the marginal value of time is equal in the second and third 
time periods, when 2 children are present; and greater in those middle 
time periods than in the first time period; and greater in the first 
period, when the only child present is younger (and the marginal product 
of time greater) than in the fourth period, when the only child present 
is older. With A4 <Al< A2 = A3, it follows from (a) through (d) that 
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To demonstrate that 
requires, in addition to (f) and (g), that 
t111 >. t331 , the advantagethat comparing the first and last children 
t342 t122 
of the first in the periods when each is alone (already shown, see (f)) 
exceeds the advantage of the last, (g), in periods when they share time;
 
and furthermore that at the same (older) age, the last child receives 
more time than the middle child. 
37 The first is true if A4 < Al, and 
( c) and ( d) 
However, it is only possible to show A4 <Al< A2 =
 A3 by 
specifying a limit on the degree of substitutability between goods and 
time inputs in the production of Sand qijk• Note from first-order 
37
The assumption is that ordering of inputs implies ordering of 
outputs. 
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conditions (7) through (12) that: 
With A4 <Al< A2 = AJ' inputs of time to the first and last child will 
be greater in the first and fourth period than are inputs of time to 
the middle child in the second and third period. For (h) to hold there­
fore requires that 
and since r1 > r2 
The restriction on substitutability is that the reductions of goods­
inputs to the first and last child in the first and fourth periods do 
not raise the marginal product of time inputs to those children in 
those periods to the point where those time inputs would be reduced 
· to the level the middle child receives in the second and third periods. 
In terms of conditions (a) through (d), this assures that if 
(where i or j changes), 
then tijk ~ tijk (where i or j changes). Similarly, in production of 
S, reductions of goods-inputs in the first and fourth periods cannot 
raise the marginal product of time-inputs to the point where the 
---
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following condition does not hold: 
au as > au as( j) (where j changes),
< 
then tsj: tsj (where j changes). In Appendix B, it is sho\m that 
given conditions (i) and (j), equalities (a) through (d) from the 
first-order conditions can only hold if A4 <Al< A2 = A3, 
It can also be shown that for the first and last child, 
the goods to time ratio is greater in the middle periods than in the 
first and last periods; and that the goods to time ratio is greater for 
the first child in the first period than for the last child in the last 
period, so that some of the last child's relative time loss is made up 
in the last period. All these results follow because, though the over­
all goods inputs are constrained to be equal across children, parents 
optimally choose different ratios of time to goods in different periods, 
as the marginal value of mother's time changes across periods. 
It is also clear from the model that differences between the 
differences throughout a child's years of growing up, will be reflected 
in birth-order effects. The greater is y1 relative to y 2 ••• Yr, 
the greater is the advantage of the first-born. The greater Yr relative 
Yr-l' the lesser the disadvantage of the last-born. 
The effect of spacing on birth-order effects depends on the 
number and relative magnitudes of developmental stages through which 
"children pass. At two extremes, there would be no birth-order effects 
at all: twins (virtually zero spacing) and the situation when the 
number of years between the birth of two children exceeds the number 
of developmental periods, so that the second child is in the same 
position regarding receipts of mother's time as was the first. But 
in intermediate situations, there is no simple rule. On the one hand, 
greater spacing (e.g. between the first and second child) increases 
the time the first child has alone; on the other hand the lower the yk 
of the first-born at the time of the next birth the less the disadvantage 
of the second child, since the greater the difference between yk and 
r1 , the greater the inputs to the new child in the critical first period. 
There is one clear effect of spacing: for a given number of 
children, the greater the average spacing among children, the greater 
the children's average quality. But spacing, as mentioned above, is 
limited because the childbearing and childrearing years are limited. 
Spacing is also more limited the greater the number of desired children. 
Thus a complete model would explain fertility demand in three dimensions: 
the demand for a certain number of children, .the demand for average 
quality, and the demand for minimum variance among children in quality; 
and would take into account that parents may make certain accommodations 
(such as spacing) as they trade off between numbers, quality, and 
birth-order differences. 
The contrast between the working and non-working mother versions 
of the model indicates what would happen if the flexible-hours assumption 
of the working-mother version were relaxed, such that mothers could not 
adjust hours between periods. With the constraint that 
tpl = tp2 = tp = tp ' the results are identical to the (substitution­3 4 
constrained) non-working version of the model. Mothers could offset 
birth-order effects by withdrawing from market work altogether in 
middle periods, but with tpl constrained to equal tp4, the first child 
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retains an ~dvantage over the last, because of the efficiency parameter. 
A more typical pattern might be for mothers to leave the labor market 
on the birth of the first child, and to return when all children are 
older, so that, for example, tpl = tp2 = 0 and tpJ = tp4 > 0.- In this 
case, the advantage of the first over the last child is accentuated, 
and early-born middle children will have an advantage over later-born 
children. 
Similarly, the result of an increase in mother's wage rate over 
time (in the working-mother version) is clear. The marginal value of 
her time will increase with each period, and later-born children will 
receive successively less of her time, as Am> Am-l ••. > A1 • The 
greater the rate of increase in the wage and the greater the rate of 
decrease in the y's, the worse off are later-born relative to middle­
born children; their advantage over the middle group can even be 
reversed. 
The fact that a steep age-earnings profile accentuates birth-
order differences (in this case, the advantage of early-borns) 
suggests an explanation on the suppl~r side for the tendency of womer1 
to work in occupations with flat age-earnings profiles, even given 
some loss in the present discounted value of lifetime earnings. Given 
diminishing returns in utility to income, the decrease in marginal 
utility due to an income loss associated with such occupations will 
be relatively smaller the greater the difference between the mother's 
potential lifetime income and her exogenous income (including in her 
exogenous income the income of her husband). In theory, then, we would 
expect the advantage of the last-born to be smaller the greater the 
ratio of potential lifetime income of the wife to that of her husband. 
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Women have traditionally opted for jobs with flexible hours, 38 
presumably due to childrearing demands which fluctuate over time. 
Such fluctuations are due not only to changes in the number of children 
but to changes in the mix of developmental cycles which children go 
through. Thus it may be minimization of birth-order differences and 
maximization of the sum of child quality which leads women to seek 
flexible-hour occupations, and occupations in which temporary with­
drawal from the labor market has low opportunity costs in terms of 
lost experience. If employers view all women as following such a 
maximization rule, employer-funded training of women will be limited 
and flexible-hour occupations will have flat earnings profiles. Thus 
supply and demand effects interact to lead women to such occupations. 
4, Empirical Estimates of Birth-Order Effects 
Hypotheses tested here, based on the predictions of the model, 
are: 
1. That first-born children are better-off by some measure 
than later-born children; 
2. That last-born children are better off than middle-born 
children, but somewhat worse off than first-born children, because 
the extra parental time they receive comes later in their development. 
38
Jobs which are compatible with child.rearing may serve the
same purpose. 
3. That birth-order effects are attenuated among children of 
working mothers~ 
4. That birth-order effects in families in which the mother 
does not work are not entirely due to parents' inability to equalize 
spending (for goods) across children, i.e. to imperfections in capital 
markets, but are at least in part due to the time constraint modelled. 
Other testable predictions, e.g. that birth-order effects vary 
for working mothers as a function of the availability of flexible-hour 
jobs, and as a function of the age-wage rate profile, are not tested 
because the data set used does not include the necessary information. 
There is support for the idea proposed in prior work on birth­
order effectJ9(but not explicitly incorporated into the model) that 
last-borns' relative advantage is greater in poorer families. If in 
poorer families, the education of older siblings exceeds that of the 
m/"\+.h<=>T'; +.h<=>n Hm,:, inp11t.!'l nf nl ni:>r sibliri_gs could :provide a relatively 
better substitute for mother's time than would siblings' time inputs 
in the average family. Educational opportunities expanded rapidly in 
Colombia in the two decades before the survey, children are especially 
39navis, Cohan end Bashi; and Altus' report of Nichols' data. 
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likely to be better-educated than their parents in families in which 
parents migrated to the urban areas sampled from rural areas where 
schooling was less available.
40 
Finally, differences in birth-order effects between children 
of working and non-working mothers as a function of mother's education 
and father's income are discussed. There is some support for the 
notion that mother's education is a better proxy for her price of time 
if she works, and that father's income is a better proxy for her price 
of time if she does not.
41 
The family size problem 
Most studies of differences in achievement levels among persons 
according to the order of their birth are concerned also with the 
effect of family size and its importance relative to birth order. 
Unfortunately there are difficulties with combining analysis of 
40see Appendix B of Nancy M. Birdsall, "Siblings and Schooling 
in Urban Colombia," Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1979. 
41T. Paul Schultz ["Fertility Differences Between Working and 
Nonworking Wives," paper presented at the annual meetings of the 
Population Association of America, Atlanta, Georgia, April 1978] 
suggests husband's income as a proxy for the price of time of non­
working wives. The assumption is that market wage offers, a function 
of education, are independent of hours worked, whereas the shadow 
value of time in nonmarket activities increases as less time is 
allocated to them. This does not imply that education has no effect 
on home productivity, only that for nonworking women, their price 
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birth-order and family size effects. Parents' demand for number 
of children is one of a set of demands, another of which is for Q, 
quality per child. Consider a system of linear equations which 
represents the N and Q decisions, relating achievement of an indi­
vidual i to that individual's family size and order of birth: 
(1) Achievementi = a0 + a1family size + a2birth-orderi 
+ ~aiXi + ~ajZj + £1 
J. J 
(2) Family size = B0 + B1( achievementi/N)! 1 1 
where Xi is a vector of socio-economic variables influencing family 
size and child achievement; the Zj are variables which influence child 
achievement but not family size; the family size of an individual i 
is N, so that 131 is +.hP ('npf'f'i('iPnt. rm AVPT'AgP Al"hiPvPment. nf 
children 
in a family; the Wj are variables which influence family size but not 
child achievement; and £1 and £2 are error terms. 
The two equations together reflect the possibility that parents' 
decisions regarding family size are affected by their goals for each 
.. 
ehlld's eventual achievement level (or, more crudely in the literature, 
llquality"). As a result an ordinary least squares estimate of 
of- ·time is captured better by husband's income than their own education. 
Table 7 (col. 2) implies education does increase home productivity; 
see discussion below. 
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equation (1) with actual family size variable entered will result in 
biased parameter estimates, for two possible reasons: £ 1 and £ 2 
are likely to be correlated, though in what direction is not clear. 
We cannot observe differences across parents in fecundity or taste; 
a preference for large nwnbers of children could be positively or 
negatively related to a preference for child achievement-oriented 
patterns of spending. Negative correlation of £ 1 and £ 2 would cause 
family size to be negatively correlated with the error term in the 
achievement equation and its coefficient would be biased downward; 
positive correlation would have the opposite effect. 
M:>reover, the interaction model (Becker and Lewis;·w1111s) indicates 
that the shadow price of investment (or achievement) per child is 
lower for parents with fewer children; if £1 and £ 2 are negatively 
correlated, this interaction effect will increase further the negative 
correlation between the family size variable in equation (1) and £1 . 
However, simply treating family size as an endogenous variable 
using appropriate techniques does not resolve the problem as far as 
analysis of birth-order effects is concerned. If family size is 
entered into equation (1) as an endogenous variable, the coefficients 
on birth-order dummies indicating whether the individual was first­
born, middle-born or last-born will be biased; the unexplained error 
in the family size equation (2) is likely to be impounded in the 
birth-order coefficients, since being a middle-born child is highly 
correlated with being from a large family. Insofar as 
42
large family size has a negative effect on educational achievement, 
birth-order dwmnies for first and last-born child.I,'en will be 
42Birdsall, Chapter II. 
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biased upward in a child achievement regression, unless actual family 
size is controlled for. As a result, it is virtually impossible to 
obtain consistent estimates in one regression of both family size and 
birth-order effects. 
For analysis of the effects of birth order, two methods of 
controlling for family size are employed below. The most direct is 
to examine intra-family differences, e.g. the difference between the 
educational attainment (age-standardized) of the first or last-born 
and the average attainment of his or her own siblings. (This procedure 
has the additional advantage of controlling for other family charac­
teristics, such as parents' education, income and taste for average 
quality of children, which influence the average level of attainment 
for all the children.) A simple test of hypotheses 1 and 2 is then 
whether the intra-family difference in achievement between first-born 
children is positive and significantly different from that of other 
children; the analogous test for last-borns is whether the difference 
is positive and significantly different from that of middle-born 
children. The result of this test is shown below. 
There are two disadvantages of using intra-family differences 
to test birth-order effects in this sample: 
1. The sample size for the former method is small, since the 
test can only be performed for those families which have a first-born 
or last-born as well as other children in the age group 6-18. Children 
from other families whose birth order and education are known but for 
whom the education of older or younger siblings is not known are thus 
eliminated. Of 1450 families with children between the ages 6 and 18, 
867 families had a first-born and other children; only 336 families 
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had a first-born and last-born and other children. 
2. For these families, first-borns are likely to be near the 
top of the 6-18 age range, and last-barns near the bottom. This makes 
results heavily dependent on the manner in which children's educational 
attainment is standardized for age. The extent and nature of differences 
in educational attainment varies by age; among the youngest children, 
enrollment rates are high, and variation in attainment is largely 
a function of differences in age of beginning school and differences 
in grade repetition. Among older children, differences in i~e age 
of permanently leaving school are probably more important. Thus a 
direct comparison of older and younger children may not be reasonable. 
For these reasons, a second approach is also employed below. 
It is to use as the units of observation all children for whcm birth 
order and education are knovm. With a comparison of children across 
all families, first-borns who are young and last-barns who are old can 
be included in the analysis. Since both first-borns and last-barns 
are relatively equally distributed across all ages (with a slightly 
higher proportion of first-borns among 17 And 18 year olds; and a 
slightly lower proportion of last-barns among 6 and 7 year olds), 
results for all children are less dependent on the age standardization. 
(The age distribution of children by birth order and complete dis­a more 
cussion of the age standardization problem are available from the author.) 
Children's educational index is then regressed on dummies repre­
senting birth order; to control for family size, a variable representing 
each child's actual family size, (ARAT), is included. As explained 
above, the coefficient on the family size variable (a1 in equation (1) 
above) cannot be interpreted as an indication of the effect, in a 
behavioral sense, of family size on children
1 s achievement. It will 
capture all associations between an individual child 
1 s achievement and 
family size, including effects of parents 1 taste for numbers of children 
and average quality in children, and effects of differences in fecundity. 
It thus allows a test of the existence of birth-order effects_inde­
pendent of these factors. Parents 1 average achievement goal for all 
children obviously does not affect the birth order of any individual 
.child, except insofar as the achievement goal affects the total number 
of children and children with high orders of birth must come from large 
families. As long as first and last effects are not associated with 
family size (and they are not in these data), the coefficients on the 
birth-order dummies will signal whether birth-order effects exist. 
(A third approach to the family size problem is to stratify the 
sar:iple by family size and examine birth-order effects within family 
size groups. This requires elimination of children with mothers under 
age 40, since stratifying by children-ever-born can only be done for 
families in which mothers have completed childbearing~3 Using this 
approach (not shown), dummies for first and last-born children are 
usually positive but seldom statistically significa...~t, and are in some 
cases negative.) 
The endogeneity of mother 1 s work status 
The testing of hypothesis 3 also presents difficulties in 
estimation. The model predicts differences in the extent of birth­
order effects depending on whether the mother works outside the home. 
However, supply of labor by the mother is jointly determined along 
41tratifying by ARAT is not possible because it is in effect 
a continuous variable. 
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with number of children and their quality, and thus, like family size, 
should not be treated as exogenous. A way to get around this problem 
would be to predict labor force supply of mothers during the child­
rearing years--but this is possible only with identifying variables 
reflecting demand for mothers' labor, and such variables are not present 
in this data set. Furthermore, the data include information only on 
the current labor force status of mothers, not their labor force status 
over the entire period of childrearing. Thus some mothers counted as 
working may have spent most of their childrearing years at home; other 
mothers counted as nonworking may have spent most of their childrearing 
years working away from homef4 
In the estimates below, the endogeneity of mothers' working 
status is ignored; the results are of sufficient interest to warrant 
more rigorous tests of the model with a better data set. 
Description of sample and variables 
The data analyzed are from a survey of 2949 households in urban 
Colombia, in which information was collected on number and ages of 
children, their educational attainment, and on income and other charac­
teristics of parents. 
The variable used as a measure of "quality" across children 
is educational attainment. The variable is standardized for the age of children 
44 ~ames J. Heckman and Robert J. Willis find using U.S. panel 
data th&t there tend to be two groups of women: workers, whose 
participation probabilities are near unity; and nonworkers, whose 
participation probabilities are near zero ["A Beta-Logistic Model 
for the Analysis of Sequential Labor Force Participation by Married 
Women," JPE, 85 (February, 1977), 27-58]. 
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to permit direct comparison of children of different ages. This 
dependent variable is defined for children aged 6 to 18. The variable 
is by no means a perfect measure of the "quality" discussed in the 
model. It is an even cruder measure of quality than a score on an 
achievement test of some kind. (Test scores have been the measure 
used in the more recent large-sample investigations of birth-order 
differences, discussed above.) Educational attainment is 
in fact a function of the "quality" we seek to measure; the assumption 
is it reflects parents' inputs of time and goods in the same way actual 
"quality" of a child would. Yet it may not; it may have a greater 




A child's educational attainment is compared to that of other 
children of the same age and sex group in the sample: 
i = childeducational attaiTuTtenti 
EDI. = j = age
1 mean educational attainmentjs s = sex 
46 -Qi = f(Qf, xQ. ), where Qi is education of the ith child, Qi 
1 
is the child's true "quality" and xQ. is money spent on education for 
1 
the ith child. But Q~ = f(t., x.) where t. and X• include all time
1 1 1 1 1 
and goods inputs to the ith child, so that xi includes money spent 
on education. If money spent on education affects Qi more than Qf, 
then Qi may be said to have a greater goods-component than would be 
ideal. 
-42-
Of the 2949 families, 2405 had children. The birth order of 
7223 children in 2288 families could be determined with relative 
accuracy, given age of children present in the household, number of 
children born to the mother and still alive, her present age and her 
age at marriage. Children of women married more than once were excluded, 
as were children in families where more than two children were no 
longer in the household. If one or two children of those reported 
alive were not in the household, other children in that household were 
included in the sample only if it was clear from mother's duration of 
marriage and the ages of those children present, that the missing 
children were the oldest. 
Of these 7223 children, 4380 from 1450 families were between 
the ages of 6 and 18; the sample is confined to children in this latter 
group by the nature of the dependent variable. It is further reduced 
by the elimination of children from one-child families and of cases 
where there are missing values on other variables. 
Some children may be from families which are not yet complete. 
least 6 years of age who had no younger siblings at the time of the 
survey will probably not subsequently have younger siblings in Colombia 
where births are seldom so widely spaced; even if they subsequently 
47
did, for 6 or more years they would have been "last." 
47 Is it problematic that first-born and last-born children at 
older ages are more likely to be living at home and thus in the sample 
if they are still in school, thus biasing upward achievement levels 
of first and last-borns? No. Older middle-barns are also more likely 
to be at home and thus in the sample if they are still in school, and 
the dependent variable compares a child's educational attainment to 
that of other children of the same age and sex also still at home. 
Only if first and last-born children are systematically more likely 
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Table 1 lists variables used in the cross-children analysis, 
with their means and standard deviations. (Variables used in the 
intra-family difference analysis are defined in the tables showing 
results.) Note that only about 11 percent of mothers worked outside 
the home at the time of the survey. 
The family size variable used is ARAT, for "age ratio." It is 
a measure of fertility whicn is standardized for the biological relation­
ship between mother's age and fecundity, using a natural fertility schedule, 
thereby permitting inclusion of children in the analysis whose mothers may 
not have completed childbearing.
48 
Results 
Table 2 shows the results of a simple test of hypotheses 1 
and 2, using the intra-family differences in educational attainment 
(age-standardized) between first-borns and other siblings ( col. 1); 
first-borns and other siblings excluding last-borns (col. 2); last­
borns and other siblings excluding first-borns (col. J). 
Here and in the following tables, results for first-borns only 
are for fw14lies with at least two children; results which also include 
The formerlast-borns are for families with at least three children. 
results compare first-borns to all other children (including last-borns); 
the latter results compare first-borns and last-borns to middle children. 
to stay at home at older ages for reasons other than schooling is 
there a problem. Even then it is likely that the bias would reduce 
the hypothesized effect--since then it would be precisely those older 
middle-born children still in school who would be more likely to be 
still living at home. In any event, a cross-tabulation of first and 
last-born children by age showed they are relatively evenly distributed 
across all ages, with a slight increase in the proportion of first­
borns in the 17 and 18 year groups only. 
48see Brian Boulier and Mark R. Rosenzweig, "Age, Biological Factors 
A New Measure of Cumulativeand Socioeconomic Determinants of Fertility: 
Fertility for Use in the Empirical Analysis of Family Size," Demgraphy, 15 















Variable Definitions and Descriptive Statistics for Samples 
of CJ-.ildren from Two and Three-Child Families 
Educational index: Ratio of 
child's years of schooling 
to mean of other children of 
same age and sex 
Educational index: Difference 
of child's years of schooling 
and mean years of other children 
of same age and sex 
First-born child dummy 
last-born child dummy 
Dummy indicating a working wife 
First-born child/working wife 
dummy interaction term 
Last-born child/working wife 
dummy interaction term 
Age of child 
Sex of child dummy, 
equals 1 for females 
Fertility measure standardi_zed 
for the age-fecundity relation­
ship using a natural fertility 
schedulea 







N = 4296 
1.01 














( . 283) 
6.30 






























TABLE 1 (continued) 
FRTSCWD First-born child/schooling of 
wife dummy interaction term 
ISTSCVID Last-born child/schooling of 
wife dummy interaction term 
YH Husband's income (1968 pesos, 
quarterly) 
FRTYHD First-born child/husband's 
income interaction term 
LSTYHD Last-born child/husband's 
income interaction term 
a






N = 4296 
1.61 


















· ( 1149) 
129 
· ( 1129) 
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TABLE 2 




Types of age average of other 
standardization siblings 
PANEL I -.020 
(based on EDI: ( . 033) 
ratio of child's N = 867 
actual attainment 
to average of child's 
age-sex group 
PANEL II .038 
(Tier I, excluding (.015) 
6 and 7 year olds) N = 671 
PANEL III .183 
(based on EDI2: ( . 059) 
difference between N = 867 
child's actual attain­
ment and average of 








( . 032) 
N = 800 
.039 
(. 016) 
N = 635 
.153 
(. 061) 
N = 800 
column 3 
Last-bcrn .::-,inus 





N = 336 
.019 
( . 032) 
N = 218 
-.175 
( .091) 
N = 336 
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Three panels are shown. In the first, the intra-family 
difference is based on an educational index which is a ratio of a 
child's actual attainment to the average for the child's age-sex 
group (EDI in Table 1); in the second, the same variable is used but 
6 and 7 year olds are excluded; in the third, the educational attain­
ment index is a difference (EDI2 in Table 1) and includes 6 and 7 year 
olds. 
The results are mixed, illustrating the problem mentioned above 
of comparing children within families, i.e. the sensitivity of results 
to the method of age standardization. There is a tendency for young 
children--in this sample, likely to be last-borns--who are at normal 
grade level to have higher scores using the ratio index than older 
siblings--in this sample, likely to be first-borns--who are also at 
9normal grade leve1~ Because this is especially the case with 6 and 
7 year olds, their exclusion ''helps" the older first-borns. ( Compare 
panels 1 and 2. ) 
In the third panel, the intra-family difference is based on 
the index which is itself a difference between a child's actual 
educational attainment and the average for the child's age-sex group. 
Compared to the ratio index, this standardization gives lower relative 
"scores" to younger children and favors older children. 
As a result, in intra-family comparisons in which last-barns are 
younger than first-borns and middle-barns, the last-barns do not 
49E-.g. a 6-year-old girl who has completed one year of school 
receives a "score" using the ratio index of 1/.25, where .25 is the 
average years of education attained of 6 year old girls. A 10 year 
old girl who has completed four years of school receives a "score" 
of 4/2.60. The score of the older child is lower, though both are 
at grade level. 
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appear to have any advantage (the "difference" in column 3 is negative). 
First-borns (columns 1 and 2) appear to have a significant advantage. 
Table 3 indicates the results of regressions using as the units 
of observation all children for whom birth order and education are 
lmown. The individual child educational index is regressed on dummies 
for being first-born (columns 1 and 2), and last-born (~olumns 3 and 
4), with actual family size entered as a control variable. (Results 
shown are for EDI, the age-standardization based on a ratio. Results 
using EDI2, an age-standardization based on a difference, are less 
pronounced. They are available from the author.) 
Coefficients on the birth-order dummies (middle-born children 
being the excluded group) are all positive; in columns 3 and 4 the 
first-born coefficients are significant at the 10 percent level; 
the last-born coefficients are significant at the 5 percent level. 
However, the last-born child dWT1I'.1y coefficient is consistently greater 
than that of the first-born, contradicting the prediction of the model. 
Several reasons for this are possible: 
1. As mentioned above, the dependent variable has a greater 
goods-component than would be ideal; it could overstate the total 
advantage of the last relative to the first, if, for example, first­
borns have higher IQ's than last-borns, but do not stay in school 
50 
longer. 
2. Last-borns are somewhat more likely to be at the young 
end of the age range than at the old end; the opposite is true for 
50 
Lindert, pp. 201-204, argues that especially for the last-
born the difference ·in parental goods-inputs is greater than in 




(t-statistics in parentheses) 
Dependent variable: child's educational attainment relative 
to other children in his or her age-sex group (EDI) -
Families with at Families with at 
least 2 children, N=4296 least J children, N=4082 
( 1) ( 2) ( 3) ( 4 ) 
Constant 1.44 1.44 1.40 1.41 
(39. 5) ( 39. 0) ( 34. 8) ( 34. 4) 
FRTD .031 .037 .0557 .0620
(o. 97) (1.11) ( 1. 69) ( 1. 78) 
LSTD .132 .149 
(2.72) ( 2. 91) 
ARA.T -.648 -.652 -.624 -.625 
( -13. 5) (-13.6) (-12.3) (-12.J) 
vr.·m -.0541 -.0412 
(-1.10) ( -0. 80) 
-.0548FRTWWD -.0542






first-borns. The age standardization used in these tables favors· 
slightly younger children at grade level over older children at grade 
level. 
J. For families which face imperfect capital markets, a number 
of factors may favor the last-born. The last-born may benefit froffi 
additional and unexpected financial resources of parents who are on 
average older and have thus higher earnings when they are in school. 
Last-borns in poor families may also benefit from financial transfers 
of older siblings, now working, and from time inputs of older siblings. 
Also, families whose future stream of income is uncertain may be more 
willing to spend heavily on the last child than on earlier children. 
All these factors imply that in the families (nonworking mothers) with 
the highest income, that do not face imperfect capital markets, the 
advantage of the last-born should be reduced. (Birth-order effects 
for high-income families are shown below. ) 
In columns 2 and 4, the effect of working mothers is tested. 
In both cases, the working mother/birth-order dummy interaction terms 
are negative as expected, suggesting the positive 
birth-order effect among children of working mothers, but they are 
not significant statistically. Based on the magnitudes of coefficients 
on FRTD and FR'IWWD in columns 2 and 4, and on I.STD and I.S'IWWD in 
column 4, the advantage of being first-born or last-born is more 
or less eliminated when mothers work. 
In Table 4, results are shown for the samples split depending 
on mothers' labor force participation. Birth-order coefficients are 
positive and in column J significant for nonworking mothers; they are 
not significantly different from zero for working mothers (columns 2 
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TABLE 4 
Child Education Regressions--Split Sample 
(t-statistics in parentheses) 
Dependent variable: child's educational attainment relative 
to other children in his or her age-sex group (EDI) _ 
Families with at 
least 2 children 








Families with at 






( 37. 3) 
1. 50 































R2 =.0427 R2=.0513 R2=.0459 R2 =.0548 
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and 4). 
Are such effects due solely to imperfect capital markets (or 
to parents' failure to plan intertemporally?) rather than to the time 
constraint which drives the model? If birth-order effects persist 
even for families we assume have good access to markets for borrowing 
and saving--the families with the highest incomes--then clearly these 
effects cannot be due solely to imperfect capital markets. 
In Table 5 are shown the results of the Table 4 regressions 
for nonworking mother families, but with the sample restricted to 
children from the 20 percent of families with the highest income (in 
the original sample of 2949 families). Columns 1 and J of Table 5 
correspond to columns 1 and J of Table 4. Birth-order effects are 
greater in the rich families; in Table 5 the coefficient on the first-
born dummy in column 1 is about three times greater than that in 
Table 4 and is significant (at the 10 percent level). The coefficients 
on the first-born birth-order dummy in column J is also three times 
greater in the rich-family sample, and the last-born coefficient is 
twice as great in the rich-family sample. Thus both first-borns and 
last-borns have a relatively greater advantage in rich families, and 
the relative advantage for last-barns is not as great as for first­
borns. Imperfection in capital markets does not alone explain birth­
order effects. 
In columns 2 and 4, the age and sex of the child are controlled 
for. Since the dependent variable is standardized for age (and sex), 
interpretation of an age coefficient entered linearly is not straight­
forward. Its negative sign here suggests that younger children in 
rich families are at a disadvantage compared to older children. Age 
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TABLE 5 
Are Birth-Order Effects Due to Imperfect Capital Msrkets? 
Child Education Regressions for High-Income Families (top 20 percent) 
(Non-working mothers) 
Ct-statistics in parentheses) 
Families with at 
least 2 children, N= 
(1) (2) 
798 
Families with at 
least 3 children, N= 
(J) (4) 
743 









( 1. 68) 
.178 
( 2. 09) 
0.216 
( 2. 40) 
.228 
( 2. 58) 
LSTD 0.292 





















has no effect when entered in the same way into a regression including 
children of all nonworking mothers (analogous to the Table 4 regression, 
not shown). Thus the disadvantage of younger children in rich families 
does not hold across the population. This is consistent with the idea 
that young children in poorer families benefit more from time and even 
financial inputs of older siblings. 
Table 6 provides a similar test of the extent to which it is 
imperfection in capital markets (rather than the time constraint) 
which causes birth-order effects. Children of nonworking mothers 
of all families, regardless of income, are included, and interaction 
terms of income and the birth-order dummies are included to test the 
effect of income on the extent of birth-order differences. The sig­
nificantly negative coefficient on ISTYIID (interaction of last-born 
dummy and income) in column 2 is consistent with the Table 5 results 
for the highest-income families. The advantage of being last-born is 
not as great in high-income families, though its net effect is still 
positive. 
Finally, does the effect of mother's education on differences 
among children by birth-order differ depending upon whether the woman 
is working or not? If a working woman's education is positively 
correlated with an increase over time in her wage (i.e. not only with 
her wage level but with the steepness of her age-earnings profile), 
then we would expect more education to be associated with a greater 
attenuation of the last-born's advantage among working women than 
nonworking women. (This could also be the case if many women currently 
working had only recently entered the labor market.) Also, insofar 
as for working women, their own education is a close measure of the 
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TABLE 6 
Child Education Regressions: Effect of Income 
on Birth-Order Differences 
(Non-working mothers) 





YH (head's income)a 
( X 10-4 ) 
FRTYHD 
(first-born x head's income) 
( X 10-4 ) 
LSTYHD 
(last-born x head's income) 
( X 10-4 ) 
Families with at 
least 2 children, 
N = J815 
1 
l.J6 
( J6. 4) 
.OJ58 




( 6. lJ) 
.140 
( 0. 54) 
Families with at 
least J children, 
N = J6J2 
2 
1. 32 
( JO .1) 
.075 






( 5. 89) 
-.0759 
( -0. 52) 
-.J46 
(-2.JJ) 
\iean income of head in this sample is 1055 pesos (quarterly income). 
Thus net effect of being first-born (at mean of income) is about .08 
(column 1), .07 (column 2); net effect of being last-born is .16 (column J). 
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shadow price of their time, whereas for nonworking women, husband's 
. . 1 ~l . ld . . .income is a c oser measure, we wou predict that education reduces 
the last-born's advantage more (or increases it less) among working 
women. 
Table 7 shows the results of a regression on child education, 
with schooling of wife (SCW) and interactions of wife's schooling and 
the birth-order dummies (FRTSCWD, LSTSCWD) added to the variables 
shown in above tables; the regression is shown for all women in 
column 1, for nonworking women in column 2, and for working women 
in column J. The total difference is summarized in Table 8, which 
shows that the total effect of being first-born or last-born is much 
greater among children of nonworking mothers, as seen in earlier 
regressions above. But the coefficients in Table 7 indicate that 
much of the difference in the extent of birth-order effects between 
children of working and nonworking mothers is governed by the differ­
ential effects of education between the two groups. For working 
mothers, the direct positive effect of mother's education on child 
achievement is greater; but for first-borns of working mothers the 
greater mother's education, the more is that advantage offset. The 
direct effect of being last-born is not positive for children of 
either set of mothers; but among children of nonworking mothers, the 
greater mother's education, the greater becomes the last-barn's 
advantage. Both results suggest that the price of time of working 
mothers is increasing over time, and the more so the greater their 
education. The nonworking mother education effect for the last-born 
51see fn.41 above. 
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TABLE 7 
Effect of }.bther's Education on Birth-Order Differences; 
W0rking and Nonworking I.:::ithers with 
at Least 3 Children 
Dependent variable: child's educational index 
( t-statistics in parentheses) 
All mothers, Nonworking mothers, Working mothers, 
N = 4082 N = 3632 N = 450 
(1) 2 3 
Constant .804 .819 .734 
(15.6) ( 15. 0) (4.71) 
FRTD .0971 .0808 .210 
(1. 66) ( 1. 29) ( 1. 29) 
LSTD .0177 .0252 -.049 
( 0. 20) ( 0. 26) (-0.18) 
ARAT -.367 -.359 -.475 
(-7.34) (-6.83) (-2. 82) 
sew .0681 .0649 .0905 
(16.3) (14.6) (7.65) 
FRTSCWD -.00799 -.00404 -.0376 
(-1.04) (-0.49) (-1.73) 
LSTSCWD .0119 .0134 .00121 
(1.12) ( 1. 20) (0. 03) 
R2=.1321 . R2= .1269 R2=.1857 
TABLE 8 
Net birth-order differences by mother's education* 
( at mean education; families with at least J children) 
All mothers Nonworking mothers Working mothers 
mean education=6.29 mean education=6.J2 mein education=6.02 
Net effect of being first-born .0468a .0553c -.0164e 
Net effect of being last-born .0925b .1099d -,0417f 
I 
V, a 
.0971 - .00799 (6.29) = .0468 
0) 
I 
b.0177 + .0119 (6.29) = .09~~~i 
C 
.0808 - .00404 (6.32) = .055J 
a.0252 + .0134 ( 6. 32 ) = .1099 
e.210 - .0376 (6.02) =-.0164 
f
-.049 + .00121 (6.02) =-.0417 
*Source is Table 7. 
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could also be interpreted as a learning-by-doing phenomenon: women 
improve at childrearing with experience, and improve more the greater 
their education; this helps the last-born children of nonworking 
mothers, but not those of working mothers. 
Insofar as women's labor force status is endogenous, and is 
especially likely to be related to fertility, these education effects 
must be interpreted with caution. They are shown primarily as 
suggestive of what we might expect if the data permitted a better 
test. (The mean of the variable ARAT for working women with at least 
3 children is .656 [s.d.: .238], very close to that for nonworking 
women .689 [s.d.: .277].) 
For nonworking women, income effects (where income is that of 
the husband) seem a better measure of mother's opportunity cost of 
time than education. Table 9 shows the results of the same regression 
for nonworking (column 2) and working (column 3) women. The effects 
of Table 7 for education are reversed for income. The interaction 
of income and last-born is negative for nonworking mothers (see also 
Table 6 and discussion there). Thus nonworking women may also 
experience some increase in the price of their time which reduces the 
last-barn's advantage--but for them this effect is picked up by the 
variable representing the husband's income. 
Conclusions 
There is evidence that first and last-born children in this 
sample have an advantage over middle-barns; among children whose 
mothers do not work, first-borns score about 6 percent higher than 
middle-barns, and last-borns about 15 percent higher than rniddle-borns 
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TABLE 9 
Effect of Husband's Income on Birth-Order Differences; 
Working ancl Nonworking l.iathers with 
at Least 3 Children 
Dependent variable: child's educational index 
(t-statistics in parentheses) 
All mothers, Nonworking mothers, Working mothers, 
N = 4082 N = 3632 N = 450 
(1) 2 3 
Constant 1. 33 1.32 1.08 
( 31. 9) ( 30 .1) (7.60) 
FRTD .069 .0755 .124 
(1. 95) ( 2. 00) ( 0. 98) 
LSTD .168 .193 -.0483 
(J. 24) (3.49) (-0. 27) 
ARAT -.586 -.567 -.572 
( -11. 58) (-10. 68) ( -3. 34) 
YH (x 10- 3 ) .0513 .0463 .370 
(6.58) ( 5. 89) ( 6. 01) 
FRTYH ( x 10- 3 ) -.0103 -.00759 -.163 
(-0.71) (-0. 52) (-1.29) 
LSTYH ( x 10- 3 ) -.0354 -.0346 .0341 
(-2. 39) (-2.JJ) ( O. 23) 
R2=.0586 R2 =.0576 R2=.1455 
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on an age-standardized index of educational attainment. These figures 
represent respectively about 6 and 14 percent of one standard deviation 
of the educational index. Results are suggestive, though not definitive; 
the predicted birth-order effects do not show up within family size 
classes and are much less strong when a different age-
standardization procedUJ'e is used. 
As predicted, differences by birth order disappear among 
children of working mothers. But the empirical results of testing 
the working mother hypothesis cannot be deemed definitive, since labor 
force participation of mothers should not be treated as exogenous as 
it is here, and since only mothers' cUJ'rent labor force status is known, 
whereas the relevant variable to test the model would be labor force 
status of mothers throughout the childrearing period. The hypothesis 
that birth-order effects will not obtain among children of working 
mothers needs to be tested with better data from other settings. 
The advantage of the last-born in these data is notable. 
Results suggest the last-born's advantage is greatest in poorer 
families; time and financial inputs of older siblings may be important 
in poor families, and whatever imperfection in capital markets exists 
would work more to the advantage of the last than the first, especially 
if parents' earnings increase with age. The advantage of the last­
born distinguishes these data from that of most studies of persons 
in the U.S. and Europe. In Colombia, educational opportunities have 
expanded greatly from one generation to the next. If older children's 
education exceeds that of parents, the value of older siblings' help 
with younger ones may be important. 
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There is some indication that for working mothers, their own 
education captures best their price of time, whereas for nonworking 
mothers, husband's income is a better proxy. 
Progress toward explaining birth-order effects is made.- The 
time constraint faced by mothers seems central. The "economic" explana­
tion offered in the sociological and psychological literature to explain 
the first-born's advantage is that family money resources are depleted 
successively with additional children; findings above suggest the true 
"economics" has to do with the price of time, since birth-order effects 
are prominent and actually greater in high-income families. The birth 
order model makes explicit the time constraint parents face in raising 
children. The empirical results imply that time inputs to children, 
which in certain cases depend partly on their order of birth, do matter. 
APPENDIX A 
BIRTH-ORDEn t.lODEL, WllP.EIN\~ MOTHER VERSION, WITH 
n CHILDREN, m PERIODS, AND r EFFICIENCY PARAJ..~TER...S 
There are 2nr + 3m + 2 first-order conditions, with Al ... Am 
the Lagrangean multipliers corresponding to the time constraint in each 
period, and Am+l the Lagrangean corresponding to the income constraint. 
elf [ au arqi aVq· ](1) Y1 Utlll = Al ; Uq-•k=-- "n +~ lJ '"' elVq. elq •~kelLq. O½: iveltlll l 1., -· l lJ 
elf( 2) =Y2 Utl22 A2 
elt122 
elf =(nr-1) Y- Ut~ 7 ,,.,_ l Am-1·i .1.1.-..L' JU-..L.' rdi,..._ l m_ l 
J..1-..1.., m ~, r 
af(nr) Utrunr = AmYr atrunr 
(nr+l) Y1 
ar 








( 2nr+ 1) 
( 2nr+m) >. = >. w m m+l 
( 2nr + m+l) au ::as 
au as( 2nr+2rn) :: "mas atsm 
au as( 2nr + 2rn+1 ) :: "m+lPsas a~xsj 
J 
(2nr + 2m+2) :: It.t.J= 1 . l 1 + tpl + tsl 
l 
( 2nr + Jm+l) = tt. + t + t m
• lffi pm 8 
l 
(2nr + 3m+2) V = -IwtPJ · + PxX + p8 S . 
J 
From first-order conditions 2nr+l to 2nr+m, it is clear that 
so that••• m 
and there are no birth-order effects. 
APPENDIX B 
PROOF OF BIRTH-ORDER EFFECTS IN THE Nl1NWORKING MOTHER VERSION 
To show that, for the 3-children, 4-periods, 2-efficiency 
parameters case, A4 <Al< A2 = A3 (given the restriction
s (i) and 
(j) in the text, pp. 28-29): 
Note that: 
If Al> A2, tsl < ts2 from first-order conditions (13) and (14), 
af> y ·--
1 h221 
[first-order conditions (1) and (3)) ==> t 111 < t 221 
Al.::_ A2 
If Al= ).2, tsl = ts2 [(13) and (14)) and t 111 = t 122 + t 221 (A) 
==>till> t 221 , since from (b), p. 
83.t 122 > 0, 
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= y af [(1) and (J)]ut2211 at221 
If AJ > A2, < [(14) and (15)],t 83 t 82 
t232 + t331 > t122 + t221 (A). 
and 
But with AJ > 
[ ( 2 ) and ( 4 ) ] 
A2, Y2 ar Ut232
at232 









t331 < t221' 
> Y1 af 
at221 
Ut221 
If AJ < A2, t > [(14) and (15)],83 t 82 
t232 + t331 < t122 + t221· 
and 
[(2) and (4)) ==> 
and 
[(J) and (5)) ==> 
>t 232 t 122 , 
ar 
yl -- UtJJl 
at331 






J.. - J.. 23 -
3. To show J.. J.. :4 < 3 
J..4 ; J..3 
If J.. 4 > J.. , ts4 < tsJ [(15) and (16)] and3 
t342 > t331 + t232 (A). 
[ ( 4 ) and ( 6)] ==> 
If J..4= J..3, t 8 4 = tsJ [(15) and (16)] and 
t342 = t232 + t331 (A)==> t342 > t2J2' since 
t > 0, from(~), p. 8J above.
331 
[(4) and (6)} ==> t,,,,.., = t,,.,,.,
.)"t,: .1-.C,: 
If J.. 4 > J..1 , < [(13) and (17)] andt 84 t 81 
t342 > tlll (A). 
> v arUtJ42 •1--
at331 
[( 5) and ( 6)]. 
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Since y2 < y 1 by assumption, A > Al ==>4 
A4 2. Al 
If A4 = A1, ts4 = tsl [(13) and (17)] and 
t342 = t111 (A). 
But if A4 = Al' Y2 H342 Ut342 
[ ( 1 ) and ( 6 ) ] . 
For the case of 2 efficiency parameters, but m periods: 
For the case of 3 efficiency parameters, and m periods: 
tlll t331To show -->--
t342 t122 
From (1) and (5) 
ar 





















so that t1u > Q.E.D.
t342 
